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COMMENT
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND REVERSE
DISCRIMINATION: WHERE DO WE STAND NOW?
Kenneth Galchus
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' and Executive Order
112462 have dramatically increased the opportunities for blacks to
successfully challenge discriminatory practices in employment.
These two major sources of authority were designed to open up em-
ployment opportunities for blacks.3 Senator Humphrey's remarks
during the congressional debate on the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ex-
emplified the problems of blacks:
What good does it do a Negro to be able to eat in a fine
restaurant if he cannot afford to pay the bill? What good does it
do him to be accepted in a hotel that is too expensive for his
modest income? How can a Negro child be motivated to take full
advantage of integrated educational facilities if he has no hope of
getting a job where he can use that education? We all know of
cases where fine Negro men and women with distinguished
records in our best universities have been unable to find any kind
of job that will make use of their training and skills.4
These remarks echoed those of President Kennedy in his original
message to Congress upon the introduction of the Civil Rights Act
in 1963: "There is little value in a Negro's obtaining the right to be
admitted to hotels and restaurants if he has no cash in his pocket
and no job."5
Until the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the issu-
ance of Executive Order 11246, blacks and other minorities had few,
if any, possibilities of redress when subjected to discriminatory be-
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
2. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 Compilation), as amended by
Exec. Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R. 684 (1966-1970 Compilation), Exec. Order No. 11,478, 3
C.F.R. 803 (1966-1970 Compilation) reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
3. 110 CONG. REC. 6548 (1964).
4. Id. at 6547.
5. 109 CONG. REC. 11159 (1963).
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havior. Blacks and other minorities could, of course, claim protec-
tion under the Civil Rights Acts of 1866,6 1870,7 and 1871,8 but for
approximately 100 years it was assumed that these Acts afforded
protection only against state action. Since sections 19819 and 198210
of the Civil Rights Acts of 1870 and 1866 were enacted under the
authority of the fourteenth amendment, it was assumed that they,
like the fourteenth amendment, required some form of state action
and that private actions were not regulated by the Acts. It was not
until 1968 that the United States Supreme Court, using the thir-
teenth amendment, concluded that section 1982 bars private as well
as public discrimination.'I It was not until 1975 that the Court, us-
ing similar reasoning, concluded that section 1981 bars any state or
private action which might hamper a person's right to contract.' 2
Under this interpretation, anyone who has been refused a job be-
cause of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin has been denied
the right to contract, in violation of section 1981. Thus, it was only
after the 1964 Civil Rights Act was passed that the Civil Rights Acts
of 1866 and 1870 were interpreted as affording blacks and other mi-
norities an alternative (that is, other than Title VII) basis for relief.13
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c) (1976).
9. Section 1981 provides as follows:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be sub-
ject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every
kind, and to no other.
10. Section 1982 provides as follows:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Terri-
tory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold,
and convey real and personal property.
11. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
12. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
13. In 1971, the United States Supreme Court interpreted section 1985(c) as prohibiting
purely private conspiracies. Griffen v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971). Section 1985(c)
provides as follows:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the
highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly
or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or
of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing
or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or
securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the
laws; or if two or more persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat,
any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support or advocacy in
a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully qualified person
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Sections 703(a), 703(d), and 7030) of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 have produced their share of the controversy
over the legality of affirmative action plans. Section 703(a), for ex-
ample, makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire
or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin."' 4 Section 703(d) makes it an un-
lawful employment practice for any employer or labor organization
to discriminate against any individual because of his race, color, re-
ligion, sex, or national origin in admission to or employment in any
training program.' 5 Finally, section 7030) provides that nothing in
Title VII shall be interpreted to require any employer or labor or-
as an elector for President or Vice President, or as a Member of Congress of the
United States; or to injure any citizen in person or property on account of such
support or advocacy, in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or
more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the
object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or
deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United
States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of
damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the
conspirators.
However, state action is an essential element of a cause of action under section 1983 of
the Civil Rights Act of 187 1. Lorentzin v. Boston College, 440 F. Supp. 464 (D. Mass. 1977),
afl'd, 577 F.2d 720 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 924 (1979). Section 1983 provides
as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
14. Section 703(a) provides as follows:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-l) to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise ad-
versely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
15. Section 703(d) provides as follows:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, labor organization,
or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training
or retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to discriminate against any
individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in admission
to, or employment in, any program established to provide apprenticeship or other
training.
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ganization to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to
any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
of such individual or group because of any imbalance that might
exist between the percentage of such persons in the employer's work
force (or in the labor organization) and the percentage of such per-
sons in the available work force in a community. 6 The Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission was created by Title VII to
enforce the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
A literal interpretation of these three sections of Title VII
would lead one to the conclusion that whites are as fully protected
as blacks (and other minorities) under Title VII and that Title VII
permits no reverse discrimination against whites. Courts do, of
course, have the authority under section 706(g) to order equitable
relief, including appropriate affirmative action, 7 where it is shown
that the respondent has intentionally engaged in an unlawful em-
ployment practice after the passage of Title VII. Courts hold that
their power to remedy Title VII discrimination is not hampered by
the prohibition against preferences in section 703(j) and that there-
fore they can order preferential remedies.' 8 The rationale for this
16. Section 703(j) provides:
Nothing contained in this title shall be interpreted to require any employer, em-
ployment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee sub-
ject to this title to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group
because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or
group on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number
or percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin em-
ployed by any employer, referred or classified for employment by any employment
agency or labor organization, admitted to membership or classified by any labor
organization, or admitted to, or employed in, any apprenticeship or other training
program, in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of such
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in any community, State, section, or
other area, or in the available work force in any community, State, section, or other
area.
17. One formal definition of an affirmative action program is:
a set of specific and result-oriented procedures to which a contractor commits him-
self to apply every good faith effort. The objective of those procedures plus such
efforts is equal employment opportunity. Procedures without effort to make them
work are meaningless; and effort, undirected by specific and meaningful proce-
dures, is inadequate. An acceptable affirmative action program must include an
analysis of areas within which the contractor is deficient in the utilization of minor-
ity groups and women, and further, goals and timetables to which the contractor's
good faith efforts must be directed to correct the deficiencies and, thus to achieve
prompt and full utilization of minorities and women, at all levels and in all seg-
ments of its work force where deficiencies exist.
41 C.F.R. § 60-2.10 (1980).
18. See Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638 of U.A., 501 F.2d 622, 630-31
(2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Wood, Wire and Metal Lathers Int'l Union, Local 46, 471
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position is that the purpose of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 would not be achieved if the effects of an employer's past dis-
crimination (occurring after the passage of Title VII) were allowed
to continue.' 9 Thus, a court-ordered remedy to reduce the present
effects of past discrimination is lawful because it is remedial in na-
ture.2 ° Questions arose, however, concerning how far employers
and labor organizations were required to go in removing the present
effects of past discrimination without at the same time discriminat-
ing, to some degree at least, against whites.
One could argue that if remedial efforts designed to rectify past
violations of Title VII are not considered to be discriminatory it
should follow that voluntary, non-judicially ordered plans designed
to remove the present effects of such discrimination would not be
discriminatory either, since Title VII certainly "cannot distinguish
remedies by their sources."'" One could also, perhaps, logically ex-
tend this argument to voluntarily adopted affirmative action plans
where there is no proven history of Title VII violations. In any
event, employers with a low percentage of blacks or other minorities
F.2d 408, 413 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973); United States v. IBEW Local No.
38, 428 F.2d 144, 149-50 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970).
19. Courts have held, however, that § 7030) precludes preferential treatment or affirma-
tive relief solely to correct any statistical racial imbalance--that is, where there is no proven
violation of Title VII. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977);
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Pennsylvania v. Glickman, 370
F. Supp. 724 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 296 F. Supp. 1232 (N.D.
Ga. 1969).
20. One question that arose after the passage of Title VII was whether the courts could
order remedial measures for discriminatory behavior that occurred before Title VII but the
continuing effects of which could be felt subsequent to Title VII. Some courts held that Title
VII did not bar affirmative relief to correct past discriminatory practices whose lingering
effects would perpetuate previous injustices. See, e.g., Associated General Contractors, Inc.
v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974); United States v.
IBEW, Local 38, 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970). Other courts held
that Title VII precluded any such relief. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Glickman, 370 F. Supp.
724 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 296 F. Supp. 1232 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
However, the United States Supreme Court seems to have resolved this issue when it held
that "an otherwise neutral, legitimate seniority system does not become unlawful under Title
VII simply because it may perpetuate pre-Act discrimination." International Bhd. of Team-
sters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 353-54 (1977). The Court has also held that "[a] public
employer who from that date [the effective date of Title VII] forward made all its employ-
ment decisions in a wholly nondiscriminatory way would not violate Title VII even if it had
formerly maintained an all white work force by purposefully excluding Negroes." Hazel-
wood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 309 (1977). Assuming that the last state-
ment would apply equally to private employers, it would seem that an employer would not
be liable for any discrimination before the effective date of Title VII.
21. Edwards, A]irmative Action or Reverse Discrimination: The Head and Tail of Weber,
13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 713, 752 (1980).
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in their work forces, whether due to past discrimination or other
economic or social forces, found themselves in difficult positions.
On the one hand, if they did nothing, they could be accused of dis-
criminating against blacks or other minorities under section 703(a)
and 703(d) of Title VII. On the other hand, adopting a hiring pro-
gram that favored blacks or other minorities over whites could result
in a charge of reverse discrimnation by whites. Thus, in a sense,
Title VII and the interpretative judicial decisions 22 that followed re-
quired employers to walk a fine line between claims of discrimina-
tion by minorities and charges of reverse discrimination by whites.
Executive Order 11246 is the second major weapon at the gov-
ernment's disposal to prevent discrimination in employment. Execu-
tive Order 11246, issued in 1965, prohibits government contractors
from discriminating against any employee or applicant because of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. It also requires govern-
ment contractors to take affirmative action to insure that employees
and applicants are treated in a nondiscriminatory manner. Written
affirmative action plans and timetables for their implementation are
required of many contractors, and penalties include cancellation of
contracts and debarment from future contracts for noncompliance.
The Secretary of Labor, Office of Federal Contract Compliance
Programs (OFCCP), has the responsibility of enforcing Executive
Order 11246 and, pursuant to that responsibility, issues the neces-
sary regulations to see that the Order is implemented.23 The guide-
lines for affirmative action have become known as "Revised Order
No. 4. ' 24
Although proof of discrimination is rquired for a judicial order
of affirmative action under Title VII, no such proof is required
under Executive Order 11246. That is, a government contractor can
be required to institute an affirmative action plan even though there
is no showing of previous discrimination.
One question that arose with respect to Executive Order 11246
was whether there was a conflict between the Order and Title VII
(section 7030) in particular). A number of lower courts had ruled
that Title VII "cannot be construed as limiting Executive authority
in defining appropriate affirmative action on the part of a contrac-
tor.' ' 25 Thus the lower federal courts have said in effect that the pro-
22. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
23. 41 C.F.R. § 60 (1980).
24. 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.1 (1980).
25. Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 173 (3d Cir. 1971). See also
310 [Vol. 4:305
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hibition against reverse discrimination in section 7030) of Title VII
relates to only Title VII and not to other programs which remedy
racial imbalance. Title VII, according to lower court decisions, is
not violated by Executive Order 11246.
Backed by Title VII, Executive Order 11246, and the interpre-
tative judicial decisions referred to above, blacks and other minori-
ties, during the early 1970's, were calling for an increased number of
affirmative action programs to rectify inequities resulting from past
discrimination. Whites, on the other hand, felt that in many cases
affirmative action meant reverse discrimination and that it was in-
equitable to burden them with the sins of their forefathers. This
issue set the stage for guidance from the United States Supreme
Court.
The first significant attempt by the United States Supreme
Court to resolve the affirmative action/reverse discrimination issue
came in the case of Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.26
In Bakke, the University of California at Davis Medical School had
two different admissions programs for its entering class of 100 stu-
dents-the regular admissions program and the special admissions
program. Eighty-four students were admitted under the regular ad-
missions program, while sixteen economically or educationally dis-
advantaged minority students were admitted under the special
admissions program. Bakke, a white male, having been rejected
twice for admission to the medical school, brought suit. He alleged
that the special admissions program operated to exclude him on the
basis of his race in violation of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment, a provision of the California Constitution,
and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.27 The trial court found
that the special admissions program acted as a racial quota and that
it violated constitutional and statutory proscriptions. The Califor-
nia Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the special admissions
program violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
Southern Illinois Builders Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 327 F. Supp. 1154, 1160 (S.D. IL. 1971), alf'd,
471 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1972); Joyce v. McCrane, 320 F. Supp. 1284, 1290-91 (D.N.J. 1970);
Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F. Supp. 83, 88 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
26. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
27. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides as follows:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assist-
ance.




The United States Supreme Court justices divided into three
discernible positions. Mr. Justice Stevens, in an opinion joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, declined
to consider any of the constitutional issues involved. Rather, he re-
lied upon Title VI since the medical school received federal funds
and was subject to its proscriptions. Stevens reasoned that Bakke
was impermissibly excluded from admission to medical school in
violation of the Act.
Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun,
and White, saw the question whether Title VI was applicable as a
constitutional issue and reasoned that Title VI proscribed only those
racial criteria that would violate the fourteenth amendment. Under
this rationale the critical question became whether Bakke's exclu-
sion from medical school was constitutionally permissible. Justice
Brennan first intimated that it would be illogical to read Title VI as
barring affirmative action programs when the legislative history in-
dicated that Title VI was passed in order to end segregation in fed-
erally funded activities.29 Thus, Title VI did not prohibit the
remedial use of race when such action was constitutionally permissi-
ble. Justice Brennan also concluded that "racial classifications are
not per se invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment" 30 but that
such classifications "must serve important governmental objectives
and must be substantially related to achievement of those objec-
tives."' 3' He observed that the racial classification used in Bakke
served the important governmental objective of remedying the ef-
fects of past discrimination3 2 and that the means chosen were appro-
priate to accomplish this goal.33 Since no group would be
stigmatized by the Davis special admissions program, Justice Bren-
nan concluded that the medical school program was constitutionally
acceptable.
Neither Justice Brennan nor Justice Stevens could form a ma-
jority for his position; thus, Justice Powell's vote became critical.
Justice Powell agreed with Justice Brennan that Title VI would pro-
scribe only those racial classifications that would violate the equal
28. Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of California, 18 Cal. 3d 34, 533 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 680 (1976).
29. Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 328-40 (1978).
30. Id. at 356.
31. Id. at 359 (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)).
32. Id. at 362.
33. Id. at 373-79.
[Vol. 4:305
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protection clause.34 He saw racial and ethnic classifications as being
inherently suspect and, therefore, subject to the most exacting judi-
cial examination.35 In justifying the use of a suspect classification,
Justice Powell wrote, "a State must show that its purpose or interest
is both constitutionally permissible and substantial, and that its use
of the classification is 'necessary . . .to the accomplishment' of its
purpose or the safeguarding of its interest.
' 36
Justice Powell noted, however, that the compelling government
purpose must be based on some findings of previous discrimina-
tion,37 and that the University did not purport to have made such
findings. Thus, for Justice Powell, the Davis program, which fa-
vored victims of "societal discrimination," imposed an impermissi-
ble burden on persons like Bakke who did not bear any
responsibility for the discrimination that the beneficiaries of the spe-
cial admissions program were thought to have suffered.3 8 He also
noted that while the University's goal of having a diverse student
body was constitutionally permissible,39 a strict racial quota was not
the least intrusive way to accomplish this goal.' This was because
the Davis program:
tells applicants who are not Negro, Asian, or Chicano that they
are totally excluded from a specific percentage of the seats in an
entering class. No matter how strong their qualifications, quanti-
tative and extracurricular, including their own potential for con-
tribution to educational diversity, they are never afforded the
chance to compete with applicants from the preferred groups for
the special admission seats. At the same time, the preferred ap-
plicants have the opportunity to compete for every seat in the
class.4 '
Thus, while Justice Powell would allow race to be one of the
factors considered in attaining a diverse student body, he found that
a strict racial quota was unnecessarily intrusive on the rights of non-
minorities. Therefore, while supporting Justice Brennan's view that
race could be a factor in a school's admission program, Justice Pow-
34. Id. at 287.
35. Id. at 291.
36. Id. at 305 (quoting In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973)).
37. Id. at 308-09.
38. Id. at 310.
39. Id. at 311-12.
40. Id. at 311-18.
41. Id. at 319.
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ell sided with Justice Stevens in finding that the specific program in
question was unconstitutional.
In sum, Brennan was willing to use racial quotas to accomplish
the valid state objective of rectifying the present effects of past socie-
tal discrimination. Powell, on the other hand, said that all racial
discrimination, be it against whites or blacks, was suspect and
should be judged by a strict scrutiny standard of review. Powell
apparently would be willing to impose racial quotas when it could
be shown that the institution had intentionally discriminated against
blacks or other minorities. He recognized that removing past socie-
tal discrimination was a valid goal, but he rejected the use of a racial
quota in the Davis program, since the necessary proof of intentional
discrimination at the University was missing. Thus, Powell would
not approve the use of quotas unless the strict scrutiny standard
could be satisfied, and this could not be satisfied without a showing
of intentional discrimination. Justice Powell did, however, see the
attainment of a diverse student body as a justifiable state objective
and one that was constitutionally permissible. Race could be one
factor in the admissions process, but a quota system, without a
showing of discrimination, was seen to be too intrusive into the
rights of nonminority candidates for admission to the Davis medical
program. Thus, in its first attempt to resolve the affirmative ac-
tion/reverse discrimnation question the Court did not strike down
affirmative action programs generally or end the use of all racial
quotas.
The effect of the Bakke ruling on the private employment sec-
tor was minimal, since it dealt with state action in a nonemployment
context. Nevertheless, the thought of having one set of guidelines
(as nebulous as they might be) defining the permissible scope of af-
firmative action might have eased some employer's minds even
though those guidelines were not strictly applicable to them.
About one year after the Bakke ruling, the United States
Supreme Court handed down its decision in United Steelworkers v.
Weber.42 In Weber, white employees brought suit under Title VII
charging that an on-the-job training program which required one
minority employee to be admitted for every nonminority employee
admitted presented a clear case of reverse discrimination. The re-
verse discrimination, white employees claimed, resulted from the
fact that during its first year of operation some of the black employ-
ees selected for the program had less seniority than several white
42. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
[Vol. 4:305
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employees whose bids for admission to the program were rejected.43
The affirmative action plan, which had been adopted voluntarily in
1974 in a collective bargaining agreement between Kaiser Alumi-
num & Chemical Corporation and the United Steelworkers of
America, was designed to eliminate the conspicuous racial imbal-
ance in Kaiser's almost exclusively white, craft work force."
Weber, a white employee claiming reverse discrimination,
charged that he and other white employees had been discriminated
against in violation of sections 703(a) and (d) which prohibit racial
discrimination in hiring.45 The district court' and the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit47 agreed that this program violated Title
VII's prohibition against racial discrimination in employment. The
United States Supreme Court, in a 5-2 decision, reversed the lower
court decisions and held that the affirmative action plan in question
was not proscribed by Title VII. Justice Brennan, writing for the
Court, noted that the question to be decided was whether Title VII
"left employers and unions in the private sector free to take such
race-conscious steps to eliminate manifest racial imbalances in tra-
ditionally segregated job categories. "48 Brennan also pointed out
the narrowness of the court's inquiry:
Since the ... plan does not involve state action, this case does
not present an alleged violation of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Further, since the . . .plan was
adopted voluntarily, we are not concerned with what Title VII
requires or with what a court might order to remedy a past
proven violation of the Act. The only question before us is the
narrow statutory issue of whether Title VIlforbids private em-
ployers and unions from voluntarily agreeing upon bona fide af-
firmative action plans that accord racial preferences in the
manner and for the purpose provided in the ... plan.49
In essence, then, the question resolved in Weber was whether a pri-
vate employer could voluntarily adopt an affirmative action plan.
The court held that it could.
In arriving at a decision, Justice Brennan looked at the legisla-
tive history of Title VII and noted that part of the Civil Rights Act
43. Id. at 199.
44. Id. at 197-98.
45. Id. at 199-200.
46. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 415 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. La. 1976).
47. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977).
48. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197 (1979).
49. Id. at 200.
1981l
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of 1964 was designed to open up employment opportunities for
blacks and other minorities.50 Based on this, Brennan argued that it
would be incongruous to read Title VII as prohibiting all private,
race-conscious affirmative action plans since this would be in direct
opposition to the purpose behind Title VII.5' Therefore, Brennan
concluded, Congress, in passing Title VII, could not have meant to
prohibit all voluntarily adopted affirmative action plans. 2
It is clear that the Court would not sanction all affirmative ac-
tion plans, but it did not "define in detail the line of demarcation
between permissible and impermissible affirmative action plans. 53
The Court, however, was willing to conclude that the affirmative
action plan in Weber "falls on the permissible side of the line." 54
Although Brennan would have been willing to admit that the
plan had favored blacks over whites, he did not think the affirmative
action plan imposed an inordinate burden on white employees.
First, the plan did not require the discharge of any white employees.
Second, the plan did not create an absolute bar to the advancement
of white employees. Third, the plan was temporary, designed to
correct a manifest racial imbalance. 55 Also, the fact that the plan
was voluntarily entered into by the company and the union most
likely played some role in Brennan's decision.
In a dissenting opinion Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Jus-
tice Burger, argued that the pertinent parts of Title VII should be
read literally as proscribing all discrimination against both blacks
and whites alike.5 6 From Rehnquist's point of view, the Kaiser af-
firmative action plan should have been prohibited since it favored
blacks over whites. Rehnquist also argued that the majority had
rewritten sections 703(a) and (d) by interpreting those sections to
mean that a certain amount of discrimination based on race was
now justified.5 7 According to Rehnquist, only Congress has the au-
thority to so amend Title VII.
The narrow ruling in Weber was that Title VII does not pro-
hibit private employers from instituting voluntary, affirmative ac-
tion plans in a traditionally segregated work force as long as those
50. Id. at 201-07.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 206.
53. Id. at 208.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 220.
57. Id. at 221.
316. [Vol. 4:305
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plans do not represent a major intrusion upon nonminority rights.
A permanent plan that represents an absolute bar to the advance-
ment of white employees may fall in the impermissible zone accord-
ing to the vague guidelines set down by the majority. Also, it is
important to note that there was no judicial finding that Kaiser had
engaged in any previous discriminatory behavior. Read in light of
this fact, Weber implies that employers can voluntarily adopt an af-
firmative action plan in a case in which there is no judicial finding
of past discrimination and, perhaps, even in a case in which there is
not the slightest proof of any past discrimination.
In January 1979 the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion adopted affirmative action guidelines which, if followed by an
employer, will, at least to a certain extent, insulate it from a charge
of reverse discrimination-the defense being good faith reliance on
the guidelines promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission. Weber, decided approximately six months later, af-
firmed the appropriateness of these guidelines which encourage vol-
untary adoption of affirmative action programs.
Weber discussed the legality of affirmative action plans in the
private sector. It offered no guidance, however, about the legality of
such plans in the public sector. The decision in Fullilove v. Klutz-
nick, 8 handed down approximately one year after Weber, offered
some direction in this respect.
The problem addressed by the Court in Fullilove had its genesis
in the federal government's efforts to reduce employment discrimi-
nation against minorities and to remove, through the use of affirma-
tive action programs, the continuing effects of past discrimination
against minorities. Governmental efforts to promote affirmative ac-
tion plans in favor of racial minorities were due to the realization
that nondiscriminatory employment practices alone would not be
enough to promote full equality between the races.
Congress enacted the Local Public Works Capital Develop-
ment Investment Act of 197619 to alleviate the problem of national
unemployment and to stimulate the economy by providing state and
local governments the needed funds to build public facilities. 60 The
Public Works Employment Act of 197761 amended this legislation
58. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
59. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6735 (1976).
60. H.R. REP. No. 94-1077, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 1746, 1747.
61. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6735 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
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and authorized an additional six billion dollar appropriation for lo-
cal public works projects. One important change62 in the new law
provided that no grant would be made for any local public works
project unless the state or local government provided assurance that
at least ten per cent of the amount of each grant would be allocated
to minority business enterprises. The legislative intent behind the
"minority business enterprise" (MBE)6 3 provision was to insure that
at least a certain proportion of government expenditures under this
program would be directed to the minority buisness community-an
area requiring economic stimulation.64 Congress determined that
the provision was needed to insure that minority firms would have
an opportunity to share in the benefits of the program.65
In November 1977 nonminority plaintiffs6 6 filed a complaint
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin enforcement of
the MBE provision of the 1977 Act. 67 The complaint alleged that
the plaintiffs had sustained economic injury as a result of the ten per
cent set-aside provision and that this provision on its face violated
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, the equal
protection component of the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment, and various antidiscrimination statutes. 68 The district court
upheld the validity of the MBE provision and denied the injunctive
relief sought.6 9 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed.70 The United States Supreme Court granted certi-
orari and held that the MBE provision of the 1977 Act was not, on
62. 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2) (Supp. 11 1978).
63. The term "minority business enterprise" means a business at least 50 per cen-
turn of which is owned by minority group members or, in case of a publicly owned
business, at least 51 per centum of the stock of which is owned by minority group
members. For the purposes of the preceding sentence minority group members are
citizens of the United States who are Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indi-
ans, Eskimos, and Aleuts.
42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2) (Supp. II 1978).
64. 123 CONG. REC. 5098 (1977).
65. Id.
66. Plaintiffs were several associations of construction contractors and subcontractors
and a firm engaged in heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning work.
67. The complaint was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York.
68. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, 2000d (Title VI), 2000e (Title VII) (1976).
69. Fullilove v. Kreps, 443 F. Supp. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
70. In affirming, the court noted that one of the most significant factors contributing to
the legitimacy of the MBE provision was the narrowed focus and limited extent of the statu-
tory and administrative program, in size, impact, and duration. Also the court rejected peti-
tioners' contention that the 10% MBE requirement violated the equal protection guarantees




As in Bakke, the Court split into three factions. Mr. Chief Jus-
tice Burger, joined by Justices White and Powell, speaking for the
Court, found the MBE program to pass constitutional review, hold-
ing that such a program legitimately came within the range of con-
gressional authority. Justice Powell applied a strict scrutiny test and
found the MBE program to be constitutional under this alternative
standard. Justices Marshall, Brennan and Blackmun applied a less
rigorous standard than Justice Powell, but one more rigorous than
the rational basis standard of review, in finding the MBE program
constitutional.
In analyzing the question placed before it, the Court first con-
cluded that the 1977 Act was an exercise of congressional spending
power and that Congress has frequently used this power to further
broad policy objectives by conditioning receipt of federal monies
upon compliance with federal policy.72 The Court also found a ba-
sis in the Commerce Clause for regulating the practices of prime
contractors on federally funded public works projects.73 The Chief
Justice reasoned that any practice by prime contractors to limit ac-
cess by minority businesses to public contracting opportunities may
ultimately affect interstate commerce. Given this cause-effect rela-
tionship, Congress was well within its authority to attempt to allevi-
ate the situation.7 a
In analyzing "whether the limited use of racial and ethnic crite-
ria, in the context presented, is a constitutionally permissible means
for achieving the congressional objectives, ' '75 the Court first dis-
posed of the contention that Congress must act in a wholly "color-
blind" fashion.76 The Court pointed out that Congress has been
71. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
72. Id. at 474.
73. Id. at 475.
74. The Court found a third basis of congressional authority to implement the MBE
program in section five of the fourteenth amendment. Section five gives Congress the power
to secure the equal protection guarantees of the amendment. The Court reasoned that Con-
gress could reasonably have determined that without the MBE provision minorities would
be denied their fair share of contracting opportunities, thus perpetuating the effects of prior
discrimination. Congress was within its authority to insure that minority businesses were not
denied equal opportunity to the proceeds of federal grants to state and local governments.
Id. at 476-78.
75. Id. at 473.
76. In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971), the Court re-
jected the argument that Congress must act in a wholly "color-blind" fashion in considering
a court-formulated school desegregation remedy on the basis that examination of the racial
composition of student bodies was a necessary starting point. Also, the Court in North Caro-
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held to have the authority to use racial criteria in attempting to
eliminate the effects of past discrimination." Were this not the case,
the status quo-the target of all desegregation process-would be
maintained. Congress, in using this broad remedial power, could
thus single out minority businesses for special attention.7"
The Court thus concluded that the objectives of the legislation
were within congressional authority and that the means to the end
were not objectionable. The Court specifically pointed out that it
did not adopt, either expressly or impliedly, the analysis developed
in Bakke but stated that the MBE provision would survive judicial
review under either test articulated in that case.79
In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell followed his analysis in
Bakke that a racial classification will be subject to strict scrutiny
and will be constitutionally prohibited unless it is a necessary means
of advancing a compelling government interest.8 0 Justice Powell
found that the MBE program was justified as a remedy that served
the compelling government interest in eradicating the continuing ef-
fects of past discrimination.8 ' Thus, in his view, both the existence
and the continuing effects of past discrimination justified devoting a
certain portion of government contracting business to minority busi-
nesses.
8 2
In reviewing the constitutionality of the MBE program, Justice
Powell found that: 1) Congress was in a position to make findings
of unlawful discrimination;83 2) there were sufficient findings to es-
lina Bd ofEduc v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971) held that "[jlust as the race of students must
be considered in determining whether a constitutional violation has occurred, so also must
race be considered in formulating a remedy." Id. at 46.
77. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 483.
78. The Court also considered the charge that the MBE program deprived nonminority
businesses of access to at least some portion of government contracting opportunities gener-
ated by the 1977 Act. The Court answered this contention by agreeing that in remedying the
effects of past discrimination some innocent parties may be affected but that the burden
must be shared by all. The burden on any one nonminority firm is likely to be small, the
Court noted, given the overall construction contracting opportunities available. In addition,
many of these nonminority firms may have reaped economic benefits in the past from the
virtual exclusion of minority firms from these contracting opportunities. Id. at 484-85.
79. Id. at 492.
80. Id. at 496.
81. Id. at 507.
82. Justice Powell observed that a race-conscious remedy cannot be compelling unless
an appropriate governmental authority has found such a need. Id. at 498. Also, even if
there were a compelling interest to support a racial classification the remedy must be nar-
rowly drawn to fulfill the governmental objective. Id
83. Justice Powell noted, for example, that Congress under the commerce clause had
the power to prohibit racial discrimination in public restaurants. Katzenbach v. McClung,
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tablish that unlawful discrimination had adversely affected minority
businesses;84 and 3) the ten per cent set-aside was a permissible
means of removing the effects of past discrimination.85 One further
criterion used by Justice Powell in reviewing the constitutionality of
the MBE program was its effect upon innocent third parties.86 He
concluded that the effect would be so widely displaced that its use
would comport with fundamental fairness.87
Justice Powell saw the MBE provision as both a reasonable and
a necessary means to further the compelling governmental purpose
of coping with racial discrimination against minority businesses.
The effect on nonminority contractors is small enough to be out-
weighed by the compelling governmental interest in this program.
Thus, in attempting to ameliorate the effects of past discrimination,
Congress may choose a remedy that is reasonably necessary to ac-
complish its purpose. The MBE program is such a remedy, accord-
ing to Justice Powell.88
In a concurring opinion, Justices Marshall, Brennan, and
379 U.S. 294 (1964). Using the same powers, Congress had enacted Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 in order to assure equality of employment opportunity. Thus, Congress
had "the authority to identify unlawful discriminatory practices, to prohibit those practices,
and to prescribe remedies to eradicate their continuing effects." Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448
U.S. 448, 502 (1980).
84. Although the legislative history of the MBE program reflected no such congression-
al finding, Congress had made such findings for previous legislation. Id. at 502-06. Justice
Powell concluded that it was not necessary for Congress to make new findings of discrimina-
tion for every piece of new legislation that might come along.
85. Justice Powell first concluded that the enforcement clauses of the thirteenth and
fourteenth amendments gave Congress the authority to choose appropriate remedies to im-
plement the compelling state interest of ameliorating the effects of past discrimination. Id.
at 510. He also stated that the remedy chosen should be upheld if the means selected were
equitable and reasonably necessary to redress the identified discrimination. Id.
In reviewing the selection by Congress of this race-conscious remedy, Justice Powell
looked at four factors: "l) the efficacy of alternative remedies .... 2) the planned dura-
tion of the remedy. . . , 3) the relationship between the percentage of minority workers to
be employed and the percentage of minority group members in the relevant population or
work force. . . , and 4) the availability of waiver provisions if the hiring plan could not be
met." Id. at 510-11. In reviewing these four criteria in connection with the MBE program,
Justice Powell found that: 1) Congress knew that other remedies to lessen the effects of
racial discrimination had failed when it enacted the MBE provision; 2) the set-aside pro-
gram was not a permanent part of federal contracting requirements; 3) the percentage cho-
sen (10%) was reasonable in light of the pertinent facts; and 4) the waiver provision would
eliminate any unfairness that might result from the set-aside provision being rigidly applied
in areas where minority group members constitute only a small percentage of the popula-
tion. Id. at 511-14.
86. Id. at 514.
87. Id. at 515.
88. Id.
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Blackmun, using their analysis developed in Bakke, concluded that
the ten per cent set-aside provision passed constitutional review.89
In their view, racial classifications are notper se invalid under the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, but must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially
related to the achievement of those objectives. 90 The standard cho-
sen for reviewing the MBE program then, was less rigorous than the
"strict scrutiny standard" but more rigorous than the "rational-basis
standard" of review.9'
Since Congress enacted the MBE program to remedy the con-
tinuing effects of past discrimination 92 and minority businesses have
received a disproportionately small amount of government conract-
ing business because of the present effects of past discrimination,
93
Justice Marshall held that there was a sufficiently important govern-
mental interest to justify the use of racial classifications in the MBE
program. The MBE program was, therefore, able to pass the first
prong of the test. The MBE program also passed the second prong
of Justice Marshall's test, since Congress could reasonably deter-
mine that racial classifications were necessary to remove the barriers
confronting participation by minority businesses in federally funded
public works projects.94
In a dissenting opinion, Justices Rehnquist and Stewart 95 ar-
gued that via the ten percent set-aside provision of the 1977 Act, the
federal government was participating in racial discrimination in vio-
lation of the equal protection standard of our Constitution. 96 In
their view, the law was unconstitutional on equal protection grounds
since it barred some members of a class from receiving government
contracts solely because of their race. They also concluded that cov-
erage by the MBE program was too broad, since no waiver was pro-
vided for those state or local governments that could show
themselves to be free of racial discrimination. Also, the statute
made no attempt to direct the aid to those minority contractors who
still suffered from the effects of past or present discrimination. This,
according to Justices Rehnquist and Stewart, was not a finely tuned
89. Id. at 517.
90. Id. at 519.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 520.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 521.
95. Justice Stevens filed a separate dissenting opinion.
96. FuUilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 527 (1980).
COMMENT
program designed to eliminate a specific evil.97
In sum, according to the Court's opinion, future legislation of
the type considered in Fullilove would pass constitutional review if
its objectives were within the power of Congress and if Congress
used a permissible means of achieving those objectives. Justice
Powell used a strict scrutiny standard in reviewing the MBE pro-
gram. He argued that such a program can pass constitutional mus-
ter only if it serves a compelling governmental purpose and is
narrowly drawn to fulfill that purpose. Justices Marshall, Brennan,
and Blackmun used the substantial relation test in passing favorably
on the ten per cent set-aside provision of the 1977 Act. It is clear
that if any future legislation based on race or any other type of clas-
sification (not necessarily one that is suspect) were able to meet Jus-
tice Powell's strict scrutiny standard, it would pass the two other
proposed tests.
If any future legislation failed to pass the strict scrutiny stan-
dard, however, it is unclear how far away from that standard the
federal program could be and still gather enough affirmative votes
for the Court's approval. Mr. Chief Justice Burger noted in Fulli-
love that although the Court used the congressional authority test,
the analysis demonstrated that the MBE program would survive re-
view under the two alternative testing schemes. 98 But this does not
mean that legislation which meets the minimum acceptable level for
the congressional authority test will necessarily pass the substantial
relation or strict scrutiny tests, although the chances would be
higher for the former than for the latter. The water remained murky
after Bakke and Weber and it was by no means clarified by Fulli-
love.
Now that the United States Supreme Court has given its ap-
proval to this type of program, Congress may be encouraged to in-
crease the number and variety of federal spending programs that
have set-aside provisions based on classification schemes relating to
race and perhaps sex. Under Executive Order 12138,99 President
Carter noted that: 1) women entrepreneurs can play a significant
role in promoting full employment and balanced growth in our
economy; 2) there are many obstacles facing women entrepreneurs;
and 3) there is a need to aid and stimulate women's business enter-
97. Id. at 530 n.12.
98. Id. at 492.




prises. Based on Fullilove and this executive order, it seems possible
that Congress may enact a provision similar to the MBE program
directed toward women. A logical question would be whether a
similar program directed toward women could pass a Fullilove-type
constitutional analysis. Since classification by sex has never been
held to be constitutionally suspect by a majority of justices voting in
a single case, it seems apparent that such a program would not be
judged by a strict scrutiny standard. In Craig v. Boren " the Court
adopted a specific standard of review for gender based classifica-
tions. Under this standard, a program comparable to the MBE pro-
gram directed toward women would be upheld if it served an
important governmental objective and was substantially related to
the achievement of those objectives. This is the substantial relation
test used by Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun in Fullilove.
Whether a program such as this would be upheld would depend on
how the program is structured and on how each justice viewed an
MBE type program in light of gender classification.
It is difficult to summarize exactly where we are in the affirma-
tive action/reverse discrimination debate because it is by no means
clear that the evolution of this problem has proceeded to a point
where all major questions have been resolved. However, it is possi-
ble to distill some broad generalizations from the Court's opinions.
First, it is clear that the Court will not view all affirmative action
programs in an unfavorable light. Second, those programs that have
the best chance of passing constitutional muster are those that do
not unnecessarily infringe on nonminority rights. Third, voluntary
affirmative action programs in the private sector are constitutional
even in the absence of a showing of previous discrimination.
In looking at the future course of developments in this area,
one must necessarily view things in light of the change in adminis-
trations in Washington. A major retreat from our present position
seems unlikely in light of previous legislation and court decisions;
nevertheless a decision on the part of the Reagan administration to
follow the basic philosophical trend set out in the transition team
report ' in this area could have a chilling effect on the vigor with
which affirmative action plans are pursued and enforced. The tran-
sition team report, prepared under the general direction of J.A.
Parker, president of the Lincoln Institute for Research and Educa-
100. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
101. The report was not published. However, a discussion of the report may be found at
106 LAB. REL. REP. (News and Background Information) 81, 84 (Feb. 2, 1981).
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tion, attacks the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for
having created what it called a "new racism in America, in which
every individual is judged by race and every employer must keep
records on the basis of race, sex, and other such criteria." ''"2 In his
view, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has ex-
ceeded the scope of its authority under the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
The report recommends that the Commission's budget be cut and
that it be barred for one year from issuing any new guidelines or
instituting any new lawsuits. 0 3 Another recommendation is that the
Commission's future guidelines be subject to review by the Office of
Management and Budget.1°4 In the area of affirmative action, the
report argues that the Commission violated the intent of the 1964
Civil Rights Act and that the entire philosophy behind affirmative
action should be reconsidered. 0 5 It is still too early to determine
what impact this report will have on the new administration's think-
ing and resultant policies.
102. Id.
103. Washington Post, Jan. 29, 1981 at 3.
104. Id.
105. 106 LAB. REL. REP. (News and Background Information) 81, 85 (Feb. 2, 1981).
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